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| combatant1 = | combatant2 = | commander1 = Erich von Manstein Günther von Kluge Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf Walther Model | commander2 = Georgy Zhukov Konstantin Rokossovsky Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev | strength1 = Operation Citadel: Soviet counteroffensive phase: 2,110 aircraft〔: Figures are from German archives. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv, Freiburg; Luftfahrtmuseum, Hannover-Laatzen; WASt Deutsche Dienststelle, Berlin.〕 | strength2 = Operation Citadel: Soviet counteroffensive phase: 2,792 to 3,549 aircraft | casualties1 = Operation Citadel: Battle of Kursk: | casualties2 = Operation Citadel: Battle of Kursk: }} The Battle of Kursk was a Second World War engagement between German and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front near Kursk ( south-west of Moscow) in the Soviet Union during July and August 1943. The German offensive was code-named Operation Citadel ((ドイツ語:Unternehmen Zitadelle)) and led to one of the largest armoured clashes in history, the Battle of Prokhorovka. The German offensive was countered by two Soviet counter-offensives, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev ((ロシア語:Полководец Румянцев)) and Operation Kutuzov ((ロシア語:Кутузов)). For the Germans, the battle represented the final strategic offensive they were able to mount in the Eastern Front. For the Soviets, the victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Germans hoped to weaken the Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943 by cutting off a large number of forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient. The Kursk salient or bulge was long from north to south and from east to west. By eliminating the Kursk salient, the Germans would also shorten their lines of defence, nullifying Soviet numerical superiority in critical sectors (which would release some of the burden the Germans were forced to take and give them time to regroup and plan another offensive against the Soviets) and regaining the initiative from the Soviets. The plan envisioned an envelopment by a pair of pincers breaking through the northern and southern flanks of the salient. German dictator Adolf Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies, who were considering withdrawing from the war. It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in the German armaments industry. The Soviets had intelligence of the German intentions, provided in part by the British intelligence service and Tunny intercepts. Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German panzer spearheads. The Germans delayed the offensive, while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, mainly the new Panther tank but also larger numbers of the Tiger heavy tank. This gave the Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts. The defensive preparations included minefields, fortifications, artillery fire zones and anti-tank strong points, which extended approximately in depth. Soviet mobile formations were moved out of the salient and a large reserve force was formed for strategic counter-offensives. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that a German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths. The maximum depth of the German advance was in the north and in the south. Though the Soviet Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives following the German attack at Kursk were their first successful strategic summer offensives of the war. == Background == As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion the Soviet army moved to a general offensive in the south, pressuring the exhausted German forces who had survived the winter. By January 1943, a wide gap had opened between Army Group B and Army Group Don, and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the Don River, including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus. Army Group Center came under significant pressure as well. Kursk fell to the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February. The Soviet Bryansk, Western, and newly created Central Fronts prepared for an offensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Center between Bryansk and Smolensk. By February 1943 the Wehrmacht was in danger of a general collapse. Hitler's belief in his own iron will as the deciding factor in the conflict resulted in German forces being left tied down in a rigid defence that did not permit them the liberty to move. Since December 1942 Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in a fluid manner. Hitler's policy of holding at all costs may have averted a general collapse in the winter of 1941-42, but thereafter it consistently resulted in forces holding ground until their position became cut off, resulting in their inevitable destruction. The 6th Army isolated in the Stalingrad pocket surrendered on 2 February. On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed as Army Group South and placed under the command of Manstein. Directly to the north, Army Group B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Center. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines. On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters, at Zaporizhia, hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov. Hitler's distrust of the General Staff and traditional officer corps, and of Manstein in particular, put him at odds with the high command of the Wehrmacht. Though Hitler desired to relieve Manstein and blame him for the failure at Stalingrad, he concluded he could ill afford to lose the man called "Hitler's most able general" by the American media. Instead, Hitler grudgingly gave him the freedom he had requested. The II SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength. Armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces. Once given freedom of action, Manstein explained how he intended to utilize these forces in making a series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk. The Third Battle of Kharkov commenced on 19 February, spearheaded by the three SS divisions of the II SS Panzer Corps. Manstein's offensive cut off the Soviet spearheads, and then encircled and destroyed the main force. The Germans retook Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March. The German offensive wrested the initiative from the Soviets. A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Center had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow the attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein. Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March. The counteroffensive left a salient extending into the German area of control, centered around the city of Kursk. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Battle of Kursk」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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